

## Community resources

[Follow us on Twitter](#) [Check our Reddit](#) [Twitter this](#) [Digg this](#) [page](#) [Contact us on IRC](#)

*courage is contagious*

## Viewing cable 05ATHENS2663, MACEDONIA NAME: GOG REJECTS LATEST NIMETZ PROPOSAL

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cable's unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#05ATHENS2663**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
<a href="#">05ATHENS2663</a>	<a href="#">2005-10-11 16:10</a>	<a href="#">2011-08-30 01:44</a>	<a href="#">CONFIDENTIAL</a>	<a href="#">Embassy Athens</a>

Appears in these articles:  
<http://wlcenral.org/node/1826>

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 002663

SIPDIS

FOR P, EUR, EUR/SE, EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2015

TAGS: [PREL](#) [MK](#) [GR](#) [AMB](#) [MACEDONIA](#)

SUBJECT: MACEDONIA NAME: GOG REJECTS LATEST NIMETZ PROPOSAL  
AS BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS

REF: SKOPJE 1222

Classified By: AMB. CHARLES P. RIES FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)

1. (C) SUMMARY: Citing its long-standing opposition to a dual-name solution, the GoG clearly rejected the latest proposal from UN Envoy Matthew Nimetz, leaving prospects for a solution dim before the EC's November 9 avis on Macedonia's EU application. At an October 11 meeting with Ambassador, MFA SecGen Rokanas had little to offer in the way of next steps, but noted that the GoG had no objection to the continued use of "FYROM" in order not to block Macedonia's EU progress. Meanwhile, the Greek media of all persuasions unanimously slammed the proposal, with many arguing that the U.S. was behind it, a charge that Ambassador told Rokanas was wrong and unfair. Some predicted that PM Karamanlis would choose to hold a referendum on the name issue -- a worrisome but unlikely development, given that FM Molyviatis has told us he fears this above all. END SUMMARY.

GoG Rejects Latest Plan

2. (SBU) In a detailed statement on October 10, the GoG deemed "unacceptable" the latest name issue proposal from UN Envoy Matthew Nimetz (full text at [www.mfa.gr](http://www.mfa.gr)). While we have yet to see the actual proposal itself, based on reftel and broadcast/print reports here, the Greeks objected in particular to a dual-name solution -- a stance they have maintained for some time and which FM Molyviatis has repeatedly told us is unacceptable. The statement also accused Nimetz of bias in favor of the Macedonian position. However, the statement devotes a lot of space to support the European perspective of Macedonia and makes clear Greece will

continue to work within the framework of the UN process.

13. (C) In an October 11 meeting with Ambassador and DCM, MFA Secretary General Rokanas said that while he himself did not believe this, most Greeks considered the U.S. to be behind the new proposal. Ambassador replied that that characterization was both wrong and unfair and that Nimetz had been careful not to brief it to the U.S. before presenting it to the two sides to avoid just such an impression. He also reminded Rokanas that when Greece had accepted Nimetz's last proposal as a basis for negotiations ("Republika Makedonija-Skopje"), few then had made such an accusation.

14. (C) Ambassador reiterated USG support for Nimetz and the UN process and that we remained anxious for a solution, especially in relation to the November 9 avis from the European Commission on Macedonia's readiness to begin accession talks. Noting that U/S Burns had made these same points to FM Molyviatis at their September 18 meeting in New York, Ambassador asked whether the GoG would accept the term "FYROM" for Macedonia's EU accession prospects to proceed; Rokanas answered that he believed so. Asked the way ahead now that the GoG had rejected this proposal, Rokanas said he was unsure, but noted that Greece's relations with Macedonia, aside from the name issue, were excellent. He did not know when or what the GoG would formally reply to Nimetz.

Greek Media Frenzy, Opposition Jumps on Bandwagon

15. (U) Meanwhile, the Greek press of all political stripes gave prominent space to the proposal, unanimously characterizing it with such words as "travesty" and "disaster." Two pro-government papers (Eleftheros Typos and Apogevmatini) argued that PM Karamanlis would now choose to hold a referendum on the name issue and use the outcome as a platform to veto Skopje's desire to join both NATO and the EU, if it chose to pursue membership with its constitutional name. Pro-main opposition party PASOK media characterized Karamanlis as "buckling under American pressure" and not receiving anything in return. PASOK foreign affairs spokesman Papoutsis charged that it was the ND government's "lack of strategy" that had brought Greece to this juncture. Both PASOK and other opposition parties have also asked the government for a briefing on the proposal and some have asked for a convening of the National Foreign Affairs Council, made up of all the parliamentary parties.

16. (C) In an October 11 conversation with poloff, MFA spokesman Koumoutsakos complained that he was taking a lot of heat from journalists, who were asking why the GoG did not hold a referendum on the issue and why it had nothing to show for its so-called strategic partnership with the U.S. Poloff noted that the USG was unfairly being attacked and Koumoutsakos agreed, but said that in this atmosphere, it made more sense to say as little as possible than take the issue head on.

17. (C) COMMENT: It should come as no surprise that the GoG quickly rejected this latest Nimetz proposal. FM Molyviatis has been clear and consistent that Greece could never accept a dual-name solution. Our key interest in all this, of course, is to make certain the name issue does not de-rail Macedonia's EU prospects. If there is no solution by November 9 -- and this DOA proposal makes the chances look increasingly dim -- at least the Greeks will not object to the continued use of "FYROM" in the accession process.

18. (C) COMMENT (cont'd): Another factor that needs to be kept in mind is the GoG's fear of what Molyviatis calls the "referendum virus." He is afraid that with the focus on the name, pressure will build even in pro-government circles for Greece to promise to hold a referendum on Macedonia's EU accession to strengthen the government's negotiating position. Besides introducing uncertainty into Macedonia's future, a referendum commitment would make it hard to avoid a similar vote on Turkey's accession. While both accession decisions seem to be distant prospects, referendum promises made now would be hard to undo later.

RIES